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Abstract 
This paper utilizes John Rawls’ theory of Justice as Fairness to assess laws banning same-sex marriage.  
It is argued that such laws are unjust from this perspective in that they do serve to disadvantage 
homosexuals in regards to the legal benefits of marriage.  In addition, legal unions (i.e. domestic 
partnerships or civil unions) that stop short of marriage do not compensate for this unjustness in that they 
do not offer the same legal benefits of marriage. 
 
© 2004 Californian Journal of Health Promotion.  All rights reserved. 
Keywords: same-sex marriage, justice as fairness, defense of marriage act, marriage 
 
 
“The paradigmatic couple in Genesis is named 
‘Adam and Eve.’  The representation is valid not 
just because it is in the Bible, but in the Bible 
because it is valid.”  (Hart, 1996:  31) 
 
“Conservatives say they abhor gay marriage 
because they value marriage.  The truth is they 
abhor gay marriage because they abhor gays.”  
(Chapman, 1996) 
 
“Some countries cut off their [Gay] heads.  We 
don’t do that.  What more do they want?” (Judd, 
1997) 
 
Introduction 
“The freedom to marry has long been recognized 
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” (U.S. 
Supreme Court:  Loving v. Virginia, 1967). 
 
Although the right to marry the person one loves 
and cares for has long been recognized as an 
essential liberty in this country, it is historically 
not a right that has been shared by everyone.  
Over time, however, marriage laws in this 
country have changed so that marriages once 
deemed immoral or unnatural are no longer 
proscribed by law, including marriages between 
people of different classes, religions, and races.  
Today the freedom to marry the person one 
loves is provided to all adults with the exception 
of homosexuals. 
 
On May 5, 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
handed down a landmark ruling (Baehr v. 
Lewin, 1993) declaring that the state must issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples unless 
they could prove a “compelling state interest” to 
not do (Mohr, 1997).  In December 1996, a 
Circuit judge in Hawaii ruled (Baehr v. Miike, 
1996) that the state had failed to prove such an 
interest and must begin to issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples (Baird and 
Rosenbaum, 1997).  The state won a stay of 
execution of this order awaiting hearing of the 
appeal, meaning that they do not have to issue 
licenses to same-sex couples until the appeal is 
heard by the Hawaiian Supreme Court in early 
1998.  Based on past rulings of the Court in this 
matter, it was expected that same-sex marriages 
would be allowed and marriage licenses would 
be granted to same-sex couples shortly 
afterwards (Sullivan, 1997).  In November of 
1998, voters in Hawaii approved an amendment 
to the state constitution defining that restricted 
marriage to heterosexual couples.  The Supreme 
Court in Hawaii subsequently ruled Baehr v. 
Miike moot due to the change in the state’s 
constitution (HRC, 2004).  Thus ended the first 
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“great hope” of making a same-sex marriage a 
reality. 
 
The debate over same-sex marriage heated up 
again in November 2003, when, in the case 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that same-
sex couples should be allowed to obtain 
marriage licenses.  The court gave the state 
legislature 180 days to amend the state’s 
marriage laws to bring them into compliance 
with their ruling (HRC, 2004a).  The 
Massachusetts legislature is currently in the 
process of addressing the issue of same-sex 
marriage and will reconvene on March 29 to 
vote on a measure that could send a 
constitutional amendment banning same-sex 
marriage to the voters of Massachusetts in 2006.  
Under the ruling of the Supreme Court, the state, 
however, is scheduled to begin issuing marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples on May 17, 2004 
(Tuchman, 2004).  
 
Under the direction of Mayor Gavin Newsom, 
the city of San Francisco began issuing marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples February 12, 2004 
despite the fact that California does have a law 
banning same-sex marriage.  Almost 4,000 such 
licenses were issued before the California 
Supreme Court ordered a halt to same-sex 
marriages on March 11, 2004 (CNN, 2004).  The 
state Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral 
arguments regarding same-sex marriage in May 
or June 2004.  Following the actions of Mayor 
Newsom, other cities also began issuing 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, including 
Portland, Oregon, New Paltz, New York, 
Asbury Park, New Jersey, and Sandoval County, 
New Mexico.  Legal challenges to these 
marriages have been filed in each of these 
jurisdictions (CNN, 2004).  Also following the 
actions of Mayor Newsom, President Bush 
called for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
that would define marriage as a union between 
one man and one woman (CNN, 2004).  Clearly, 
then, the debate over same-sex marriage is 
currently in full swing and is likely to remain a 
principal issue in this election year. 
 
Defense of Marriage Acts 
Legally, marriage has traditionally been a state-
level matter in the United States with each state 
enjoying the power to grant marriage licenses 
and stipulate what qualifications people must 
meet in order to obtain those licenses.  Although 
these qualifications differ from state to state, 
along factors such as age and closeness of 
familial relationship, each state now recognizes 
legal marriages from other states, even if those 
involved would not meet their own 
qualifications.  This recognition of marriage 
across states is required by the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which 
obligates states to honor “the acts, records, and 
judicial proceedings” of the other states unless 
those laws are in violation of their own 
legitimate public policy (Infanti, 1997:  232). 
 
The possibility that same-sex marriage might be 
legalized in some states and the understanding 
that such marriages would have to be recognized 
by the remaining states under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause unless such marriages were 
outlawed in those states has led to strong and 
swift reactions from conservative groups and 
anti-gay activists.  Such groups joined together 
to inaugurate the National Campaign to Protect 
Marriage, a movement that has been 
instrumental in the introduction and passage of 
so-called Defense of Marriage Acts (DOMA) 
federally and at the state level.  As of February 
2004, DOMA or other laws banning same-sex 
marriage have passed into law at the federal 
level and in at least 38 states (see Table 1). 
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Table 1 
States with Laws Banning Same-Sex Marriage 
 
Alabama Georgia Maine North Carolina Utah 
Alaska* Hawaii* Michigan North Dakota Virginia 
Arizona Idaho Minnesota Ohio Washington 
Arkansas Illinois Mississippi Oklahoma West Virginia 
California* Iowa Missouri Pennsylvania  
Colorado Kansas Montana South Dakota  
Delaware Kentucky Nebraska* Tennessee  
Florida Louisiana Nevada* Texas  
*Ballot initiatives banned same-sex marriages in these 5 states; the other 33 states banned same-sex marriage through laws 
passed by the legislature.  Source:  Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund.  2004.  “States with Laws Banning Same-Sex 
Marriage.”  Accessed online March 14, 2004, http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1427
 
 
President Clinton signed into law the federal 
DOMA on September 21, 1996 after it had 
easily passed both the House and Senate.  
DOMA passed in the House by a vote of 342-87 
and in the Senate by a vote of 85-14 (Mohr, 
1997).  At the federal level, DOMA 
accomplishes two objectives (Baird and 
Rosenbaum, 1997).  First, it allows states to 
refuse to recognize same-sex marriages legalized 
in other states (DOMA, 1997).  In the case of 
same-sex marriage, then, states have explicitly 
been given the right to waive the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the Constitution and refuse to 
honor marital contracts bestowed in other states.  
Through the passage of their own anti-marriage 
laws, 38 states have already exercised that right 
even though same-sex marriage has yet to be 
legalized in any other state. 
 
The second objective of the federal DOMA is to 
render a federal definition of the terms marriage 
and spouse.  Marriage is defined as “a legal 
union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife” and a spouse is defined as “a 
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a 
wife” (DOMA, 1997:  18).  The implications of 
this portion of DOMA are that all federal rights 
and benefits given to legal spouses do not and 
will not apply to same-sex couples, even if they 
are allowed to legally marry in any of the 50 
states.  Notwithstanding recognition of same-sex 
marriage by Hawaii or any other state(s), the 
federal government does not and will not 
recognize same-sex marriages. 
 Although the rhetoric around the support 
of DOMA is that it generally serves to protect 
the institution of marriage, the principle effect of 
the legislation is that same-sex couples are 
continued to be denied the basic rights, benefits, 
and protections provided by marriage.  Even if 
Hawaii legalizes same-sex marriages, these 
couples will still be denied these federal rights 
and protections along with the recognition of 
their marriages (Carl, 1997).  Six months after 
passing DOMA, Congress asked the 
congressional General Accounting Office 
(GAO) to investigate and determine what legal 
marriage means under federal law, that is, to 
determine what it is that they denied to same-sex 
couples (Byron, 1997).  The GAO concluded 
that there were at least 1,049 laws that addressed 
marital status in some form, many of these 
providing federal benefits and protections to 
married partners in various categories, including 
Social Security programs, veterans’ benefits, 
taxation, and employment benefits (GAO, 
1997). 
 
While each of the DOMA passed at the state 
level differs slightly, there are two principle 
purposes of these state-level acts.  First, all state-
level DOMA specify that same-sex marriages 
performed in other states will not be legally 
recognized.  That is, states that have passed 
these acts are exercising their right to suspend 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the case of 
same-sex marriages.  The second objective of 
these state-level DOMA is to stipulate that 
same-sex couples will not be allowed to marry 
 17
R. R. Dobbs / Californian Journal of Health Promotion 2004, Volume 2, Special Issue: LGBT, 15-23 
 
in that state.  This is a stipulation that is 
unnecessary in the DOMA of most states, since 
such marriages were already prohibited. 
 
Homosexual couples in this country have never 
enjoyed the same opportunities and rights of 
marriage as have heterosexual couples.   And, in 
fact, the mere possibility that same-sex couples 
might obtain the same opportunities and rights 
as heterosexual couples in terms of legal 
marriage has led to the passage of legislation 
denying these rights before they were ever 
conferred.   
 
Justice as Fairness, Marriage and DOMA 
According to Rawls theory of Justice as 
Fairness, a well-ordered society is typified as “a 
scheme of cooperation for reciprocal advantage 
regulated by principles which persons would 
choose in an initial situation that is fair”  (Rawls, 
1971:  33).  The general conception of Rawls’ 
notion of justice is twofold.  First and foremost, 
Rawls (1971) argues that everyone should have 
equal liberty of opportunity.  Second, any 
inequalities which do exist in the distribution of 
these liberties and opportunities are to be to the 
advantage of the least favored while not 
disadvantaging anyone else.  This is what Rawls 
(1971) refers to as the difference or maximin 
principle.  
 
In order to apply the two principles of justice in 
assessing the justness of legislation and social 
policies, Rawls (1971) sets up a four-stage 
sequence.  The first three stages of this 
sequence, the original position, the constitutional 
convention, and the legislative stage, correspond 
to three cardinal questions that should be 
addressed concerning the distribution of marital 
opportunities and rights. First, what 
characteristics would a just distribution of 
marital rights possess?  Second, to what extent is 
the state responsible for honoring legal 
contracts?   Lastly, is legal discrimination based 
on personal characteristics, such as sex, race, 
and sexual orientation just?  According to Rawls 
(1971), laws and policies are just if they are 
what a rational person would choose at the 
appropriate stage in the sequence. 
 
In addressing the first question concerning what 
characteristics a just distribution of marital 
rights might possess, it is necessary to 
understand Rawls’ notion of the concepts of the 
original position and the veil of ignorance.  It is 
in the fair initial situation, or the original 
position, that people contract with one another 
as to the distribution of primary goods that will 
exist in society.  While in the original position, 
people are under the veil of ignorance in which 
they know nothing about their own position and 
interests in society, however, they do know “the 
actual distribution of circumstantial and genetic 
traits among persons in society” (Roemer, 1996:  
173).  Since Rawls (1971) assumes people to be 
rational, he argues that they will choose the 
distribution that is most likely to give them the 
opportunity for more primary goods rather than 
less.  Not knowing what their exact position and 
interests are, he argues that the distribution 
people in the original position will choose is one 
that meets his two principles of justice:  1) equal 
liberty and 2) inequalities that benefit the least 
advantaged, while not disadvantaging anyone 
else.  In other words, not knowing what their 
positions and interests are, people will choose 
rules that apply equally to everyone, not just to 
some. 
 
The first step in understanding the distribution of 
any social good from this perspective is to assess 
what distribution of that good would be chosen 
by people in the original position.  In terms of 
marriage, the knowledge that people in the 
original position would posses is twofold.  First, 
they know that marriage is defined as a social 
good only when a person is free to decide to 
marry whom they choose.  Second, they know 
that there will be heterosexuals and homosexuals 
in society, that is, they know the circumstantial 
and genetic traits that will exist in society.  What 
they do not know is their own position and 
interests in society.  I would argue that a rational 
person under these circumstances would choose 
equal liberty to marry for both groups, giving 
themselves the best possible chance to enjoy the 
right to marry as part of their life plan. 
 
According to Rawls (1971), liberty is unequal 
when one class of people has greater liberty than 
another.  Rawls (1971) contends that people are 
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at liberty to do something when they are free 
from certain constraints either to do or not to do 
it and when doing it or not doing it is protected 
from interference of others.  Considering this 
first question, then, it appears that DOMA would 
not be considered just from this perspective 
since such acts serve to prohibit homosexuals 
from marrying.  In other words, the ability of 
homosexuals to marry whom they choose is 
constrained by the state, meaning that they do 
not share the same liberty to marry that 
heterosexuals do.  The first principle of justice, 
then is not met by DOMA.  In and of itself, this 
does not mean that the distribution of marital 
rights stipulated by DOMA is necessarily unjust, 
however, it does provide evidence of its 
unjustness.  In order to determine the overall 
justness of DOMA, subsequent stages in the 
sequence must be considered as well as the 
second principle of justice. 
 
The second question to consider from this 
perspective concerns the extent to which the 
state is responsible for assuring that contracts are 
honored.  In dealing with this question, it is 
useful to understand Rawls’ conception of the 
constitutional convention, which is the stage that 
follows the original position in his four-stage 
sequence. During this stage, the veil of 
ignorance is lifted somewhat so that those 
involved know slightly more about society in 
this stage than they do in the original position, 
however, they still know nothing about their 
own position and interests.  It is at this stage that 
the basic rights of citizens are chosen as well as 
the constitutional powers and responsibilities of 
the government. 
 
Rawls (1971) contends that one of the 
responsibilities of the state is to maintain the 
stability of social cooperation.  Part of this 
maintenance of stability involves enforcement of 
the rules of the society. 
 
“It is reasonable to assume that even in a well-
ordered society the coercive powers of 
government are to some degree necessary for the 
stability of social cooperation.  For although 
men know that they share a common sense of 
justice and that each wants to adhere to the 
existing arrangements, they may nevertheless 
lack full confidence in one another. They may 
suspect that some are not doing their part, and so 
they may be tempted to not do theirs” (Rawls, 
1971, 240). 
 
Coercion, then is the way the state compensates 
for the lack of confidence that people may have 
in one another in fulfilling their part in society. 
Knowing that people may lack confidence in one 
another’s cooperative abilities, rational people in 
the constitutional convention would allow the 
possibility of state coercion in order to best 
ensure that their own liberties will not be 
infringed upon by others.  One area in which 
confidence is particularly important from this 
perspective is in contractual relationships.  In 
order for society to work properly, people must 
be willing to enter into contractual relationships 
with one another for mutual advantage.  People 
will be willing to do so only when they believe 
that these contracts that are entered into 
knowingly and freely will be honored.  Barring 
this assurance, it is likely that people will be less 
willing to enter into contractual relationships 
with one another.  It is rational, then, that part of 
the state’s power of coercion would encompass 
some way of providing assurance that 
contractual relationships will be honored, 
thereby fostering people’s confidence in the 
fidelity of contracts. From a justice as fairness 
perspective, then, one of the responsibilities of a 
just state chosen in the constitutional convention 
would involve the recognition and preservation 
of legal contracts.  I would argue that the state’s 
ability to foster such confidence is undermined 
to the extent that they do not recognize contracts 
that are legally established. 
 
Since marriage is best understood as a legal 
contract between two people and the state, when 
such relationships are entered into legally, they 
should be recognized by the state as would any 
form of legal contract.  To allow the state to 
circumscribe one type of contract, such as 
legalized same-sex marriages, may serve to 
increase people’s lack of confidence in one 
another and in the stability of contracts rather 
than fostering confidence in such relationships.  
Also, if the state is allowed to ignore certain 
contracts, then it may become easier for 
individuals to rationalize their own breach of 
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contractual relationships.  In other words, if the 
state is allowed to refuse to recognize contracts 
for certain people that it recognizes for others, 
all other contracts are placed in potential 
jeopardy of not being honored, either by 
individuals or by the state. Addressing this 
question points out another way that DOMA 
could be considered unjust from this perspective.  
Since these acts allow states to refuse to 
recognize marital contracts that are legally 
entered into, they are in contention with the 
principle that states should foster people’s 
confidence in one another and in the state by 
assuring that legal contracts are honored. 
 
The third question that must be addressed from a 
Justice as Fairness perspective concerns the 
sanctioning of legal discrimination based on 
personal characteristics, such as sex, race, and 
sexual orientation.  This question may be best 
addressed from the legislative stage of Rawls’ 
sequence.  At this stage, the veil of ignorance is 
lifted slightly more than in the previous two 
stages so that more is known about society as a 
whole, including the “hierarchies of political, 
economic, and social forms” necessary for social 
cooperation, yet individuals still do not know 
their own position and interests in society 
(Rawls, 1971:  199).  According to Rawls 
(1971), this stage is most concerned with the 
difference or maximin principle, or with 
assessing whether or not the least favored 
benefit from the distribution regardless of their 
disadvantaged position. 
 
It is unlikely that rational actors would choose to 
allow laws to be passed that discriminated based 
on personal characteristics at this stage unless 
those groups discriminated against benefited in 
some way from this discrimination.  The first 
reason that such discrimination would not be 
chosen at this stage is that it directly contradicts 
Rawls’ first principle of justice, equal liberty, 
which is always lexically prior to the difference 
principle.  Such discrimination also has the 
potential to contradict the second principle of 
justice, that the least advantaged are to benefit 
from any inequalities that exist.  It is unlikely, 
then, that rational people in the legislative stage 
would allow for some groups of people to be 
given fewer rights than others based solely on 
personal characteristics without knowing that 
those groups would still gain. If, however, the 
groups of people that are given fewer rights 
under the law benefit from their disadvantage, 
this differential distribution of rights would not 
necessarily be unjust, as long as no other group 
was benefiting from their disadvantage.  If some 
other group is benefiting from this 
discrimination, then this leads to a separate 
problem with such discrimination, namely, the 
potential of allowing some groups to benefit 
from their natural attributes, which is not 
allowed from a Justice as Fairness.  To “say that 
human beings are equal is to say that none have 
a claim to preferential treatment in the absence 
of compelling reasons” (Rawls, 1971:  507). 
 
In terms of the distribution of marital 
opportunities, rational actors at this stage would 
know the hierarchical ordering of heterosexuals 
and homosexuals in relation to one another, that 
is, they would know that heterosexuals would be 
the majority in terms of number and in terms of 
rights.  What people at the legislative stage 
would still not know is their own position and 
interests.  I would argue that rational actors at 
this stage would still opt for equal access to 
marital opportunities for both groups to marry 
whom they choose, thereby giving themselves 
the best possible chance to include marriage as 
part of their life plan.  If unequal access to 
marital opportunities would not disadvantage the 
group without access, then such unequal access 
might be chosen at this stage and would not 
necessarily be considered unjust.  However, to 
the extent that DOMA serve only to prohibit 
same-sex couples to marry, they would be 
considered unjust from this stage of a Justice as 
Fairness perspective since they deny rights to a 
certain group while not advantaging that group. 
 
In order to compensate for the lack of legal 
rights associated with marriage, several local 
governments and at least one state (Vermont) 
have legally recognized same-sex relationships, 
or domestic partnerships in some capacity.  
Domestic partnerships apply to unmarried 
opposite-sex couples as well as to same-sex 
couples. The implicit purpose of such 
recognition is to provide same-sex couples with 
the privileges of legal marriage even though they 
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are not allowed to legally marry.  To the extent 
that this recognition translates into the extension 
of the benefits of legal marriage to same-sex 
couples, acts that prohibit legal marriage could 
be considered just from this perspective as long 
as opposite-sex couples were not being 
advantaged as a result of the denial of same-sex 
marriage.  However, in the majority of cases, the 
recognition of same-sex relationships is nothing 
more than mere recognition. For example, 
Vermont’s recognition provides only one benefit 
to same-sex couples – health insurance coverage 
for partners of state workers (Mohr, 1997).  So, 
there are no automatic rights and benefits 
associated with such recognition as there are 
with legal marriage.  In some instances, this 
recognition may make it easier for these couples 
to legally arrange for some of the automatic 
benefits of marriage, such as hospital visitation 
and medical decision-making, however, these 
benefits are not guaranteed as they are to legally 
married persons. 
 
On the whole, domestic partnership laws provide 
nothing close to the benefits of legal marriage to 
same-sex couples.  As shown in Table 2, most of 
the benefits that automatically come to legally 
married couples are denied to same-sex couples 
in spite of domestic partnership laws (Mohr, 
1997). In other words, domestic partnership laws 
are not serving to benefit same-sex couples.  To 
the extent that this is true, the existence of 
domestic partnership laws do nothing to make 
DOMA more just since same-sex couples are 
denied the opportunities, rights, and benefits of 
legal marriage. 
 
Table 2 
Selected Benefits Associated with Legal Marriage and Domestic Partnership 
 
State-Level Benefits: Legal Marriage Domestic Partnership 
 Assumption of Spouse’s Pension Automatic No 
 Burial Determination Automatic No 
 Various Property Rights Automatic No 
 Child Custody Automatic No 
 Crime Victim’s Recovery Benefits Automatic No 
 Divorce Protections Automatic No 
 Domestic Violence Intervention Automatic In selected jurisdictions 
 Inheritance Automatic No – Will necessary and is 
contestable 
 Immunity from Testifying Against 
Spouse 
Automatic No 
 Insurance Breaks Automatic No 
 Joint Adoption and Foster Care Probable No – Prohibited in some states 
 Joint Parenting Automatic No 
 Medical Decisions on Behalf of 
Partner 
Automatic No – Physician’s directives or 
powers of attorney are 
necessary 
 Visitation of Partner in Hospital 
(ICU) 
Automatic Often prohibited. Physician’s 
directives or powers of 
attorney must be drawn 
 Wrongful Death Benefits Automatic No 
Federal-level Benefits:   
 Immigration Automatic No 
 Social Security Survivor Benefits Automatic No 
Source:  “Comparing Legal Marriage/Ceremonial Marriage/Domestic Partner Benefits.”  Partners Task Force for Gay and 
Lesbian Couples.  1997.  Internet Homepage:  http://www.buddybuddy.com/m-comp.html
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Conclusion 
I contend that Defense of Marriage Acts are 
unjust from a Justice as Fairness perspective for 
at least three reasons.  First, such acts do not 
meet either of the two principles of justice 
established by Rawls.  In violation of the first 
principle of equal liberty, such acts serve to deny 
the opportunity of legal marriage to same-sex 
couples.  While this in and of itself is not enough 
to warrant a conclusion of unjustness, these acts 
also fail to meet Rawls’ second principle of 
justice.  The inequalities in the opportunity to 
marry are not justified in that same-sex couples 
do not any measure of advantage from the 
distribution, in fact, they are disadvantaged by it.  
Lastly, such acts would be considered unjust 
because their denial of legal contracts has the 
potential of weakening the bonds of other 
contractual relationships, which are the very 
essence of a well-ordered society from this 
perspective. 
 
Marriage is a social good that should be 
provided to same-sex couples.  Doing so 
provides them with the basic opportunities, 
rights, and benefits that they are currently 
denied.  And, contrary to arguments of 
proponents of DOMA, extension of marital 
opportunities to same-sex couples does nothing 
to harm the benefits and rights of heterosexual 
married couples. 
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